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UTILITY BASED PRICING OF CONTINGENT CLAIMS IN
INCOMPLETE MARKETS
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Abstract. In a discrete setting, we develop a model for pricing a con-
tingent claim in incomplete markets. Since hedging opportunities in-
ﬂuence the price of a contingent claim, we ﬁrst introduce the optimal
hedging strategy assuming that a contingent claim has been issued: a
strategy implemented by investing initial wealth plus the selling price
is optimal if it maximizes the expected utility of the agent’s net payoﬀ,
which is the diﬀerence between the outcome of the hedging portfolio and
the payoﬀ of the claim.
Next, we introduce the ‘reservation price’ as a subjective valuation of
a contingent claim. This is deﬁned as the minimum price that makes
the issue of the claim preferable to stay put given that, once the claim
has been written, the writer hedges it according to the expected utility
criterion. We deﬁne the reservation price both for a short position (reser-
vation selling price) and for a long position (reservation buying price) in
the claim. When the contingent claim is redundant, both the selling and
the buying price collapse in the usual Arrow-Debreu (or Black-Scholes)
price. If the claim is non-redundant, then the reservation prices are
interior points of the bid-ask interval. We provide also two numerical
examples with diﬀerent utility functions and contingent claims. Some
qualitative properties of the reservation price are shown.
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11. Introduction
In this paper we develop a model for hedging and pricing a non-redundant
contingent claim when the ﬁnancial market is incomplete.
Hedging and pricing are two sides of the same problem. In a complete
ﬁnancial market, according to the ‘replication approach’, the price of a con-
tingent claim is the cost of the hedging portfolio. On the other hand, by the
‘martingale approach’, the price is the present value of the random payoﬀ
with respect to the unique state (or Arrow-Debreu) price vector. This du-
ality between the ‘replication’ and the ‘martingale’ approaches permits to
solve the pricing problem easily under market completeness. It is less ob-
vious that the duality can be exploited also when the market is incomplete
and the claim to be priced is redundant.
Essentially, given a contingent claim hedging and pricing are the same
problem solved in two diﬀerent spaces: hedging works in the space of port-
folios; pricing in the space of payoﬀs. When the contingent claim is non-
redundant, the duality relation cannot be usefully exploited, because it does
not provide a unique price. Actually, on portfolios side, there is no replicat-
ing portfolio and the hedging strategy could involve a risky position; on the
payoﬀs side, there is an inﬁnite number of martingale measures and each
of them provides a diﬀerent price for the contingent claim. This leads to
an interval where the minimum is the ‘ask price’ and maximum is the ‘bid
price’. In correspondence to each price of the bid-ask interval there is a
hedging strategy, once the hedging criterion has been chosen.
Assume that a new (non-redundant) contingent claim is issued by, say,
an investment banker so that a proper price for this claim should be found.
The bid price is the minimum cost of a super-replicating portfolio for a
short position in the claim and the ask price is the maximum cost of a
sub-replicating portfolio for a long position in the claim. If the potential
2counterparts of the writer are risk averse, no one would buy a claim oﬀered
at the bid price (and a risk averse writer would not sell the claim at the ask
price). A risk averse agent will buy the claim at a price lower than the bid
price and will sell at a price higher than the ask price. If the claim is issued
for a price lower than the bid price, the writer must commit his wealth in
the deal because the hedging strategy becomes risky.
In the ﬁnancial literature several models have been proposed to partially
hedge the claim if the writer accepts a risky hedging strategy. The ﬁrst
was the risk-minimizing strategy proposed by F¨ ollmer and Sondermann in
their 1986 seminal article [11]. According to this model, given a European
non-redundant contingent claim, the writer’s goal is the minimization of the
quadratic additional cost of revision of the hedging portfolio at each trading
date. The most important features of F¨ ollmer and Sondermann’s model are
that the hedging portfolio can be obtained by backward recursion and that
the strategy is mean self-ﬁnancing. Other models based on the same idea
have been proposed by Schweizer [17] and Sch¨ al [16]. All these models are
limited mainly by the fact that, according to a quadratic criterion, both
positive and negative net payoﬀs resulting from the hedging strategy are
assumed to be equally disliked by the agent. One of the consequences of this
drawback is that, in a general setting, pricing a non-redundant contingent
claim by taking the cost of the hedging portfolio can lead to a negative price
even if the claim has a non-negative payoﬀ. Obviously, this is not consistent
with the absence of arbitrage opportunities.
Since risk is involved, a hedging criterion based on the maximization of
the expected utility for the net payoﬀ of the writer comes up as the most
natural solution. A model based on a utility gradient approach is due to
Davis [7], exploiting the idea ﬁrst oﬀered in Lucas [14] (see also Duﬃe and
Skiadas [10]). Davis’ model proposes a (fair) price for the contingent claim
3based on the assumption that the agent, an expected utility maximizer, is
willing to divert only an inﬁnitesimal amount of his initial wealth to sell
(or to purchase, as for the buyer) the claim. Once the fair price has been
determined, Davis ﬁnds out the optimal hedging strategy for a given (not
necessarily inﬁnitesimal) number of units of the claim by maximizing the
expected utility of the net payoﬀ.
The problem of risky hedges has been addressed also in the literature
on pricing and hedging in presence of transaction costs. Actually, if there
are transaction costs, the perfect replication of a contingent claim could
not be an eﬃcient strategy. It has been proved by Bensaid, Lesne, Pag´ es
and Scheinkman [3] that transaction costs can make it cheaper to domi-
nate than to replicate a claim. This amounts to say that transaction costs
create market incompleteness since not all risks can be hedged; moreover,
the issue of a derivative security when the market presents frictions involves
unavoidable risks. Since the hedging of the contingent claim involves risk,
then its price (i.e. the cost of the hedging portfolio) depends on the risk at-
titude of the agent. The concept of reservation price for a contingent claim
(Andersen and Damgaard [1], Clewlow and Hodges [5], Davis, Panas and
Zariphopoulou [8], Hodges and Neuberger [13]) takes into account both the
agent’s preferences and the ﬁnancial market structure.
More speciﬁcally, the reservation selling price of a claim is deﬁned as the
price that makes the following two situations equivalent from the writer’s
standpoint: (a) writing a prespeciﬁed number of the claim and hedging the
liability deriving from the deal with a portfolio of existing assets ﬁnanced
with the revenue of the sale of the claim, and (b) leaving his wealth optimally
invested in the existing assets. The reservation buying price can be deﬁned
in the same way from a buyer viewpoint. It should be clear that the price
4is, as a rule, dependent on the number of claims issued and on the wealth,
utility and beliefs of the writer.
The reservation price above deﬁned is diﬀerent from Davis’ fair price.
The fair price of the claim does not depend on the number of units written,
as should be conceivably expected, and the hedging strategy is consistent
with the price only if the number of units sold is “inﬁnitesimal”. We will
show that the reservation price is consistent with Davis’ fair price when the
quantity issued is inﬁnitesimal.
We frame the model in a discrete-time discrete-state space setting. We ex-
amine the problem of hedging and pricing a non redundant contingent claim
mainly from the viewpoint of the writer. Hence, throughout the paper we
will be talking of “hedging a liability” because (once issued) the contingent
claim gives the writer the obligation to pay a state-contingent payoﬀ. The
description of the buyer’s point of view is straightforward and can be easily
derived from the results we present below.
The paper is organized as follows: after introducing the notation (Sec-
tion 2), we ﬁrst study the agent’s hedging problem assuming that he has
already issued a given amount of contingent claims (Section 3). We provide
also some suﬃcient conditions on the agent’s preferences and on the ﬁnancial
market to make the problem meaningful (Section 4). Next, we introduce the
reservation price and study its properties. In particular we show that the
reservation price is the Arrow-Debreu price if the claim is redundant, that
the reservation price is always greater than the ask price and lower than
the bid price and that it is consistent with Davis’ fair price if the quantity
traded is inﬁnitesimal (Section 5). In the same section we provide also two
numerical examples regarding option pricing in incomplete markets. We ﬁ-
nally give some concluding remarks in Section 6. Proof of propositions are
5relegated in the Appendix A. In Appendix B, we describe the non-trivial
procedure used to calculate the reservation price in the examples.
2. Notation
The notation we introduce is standard in ﬁnancial economics.
1 Let there
be given T + 1 dates {t = 0,1,...,T}. We assume that an agent can
correctly anticipate the states of nature: let there be given S states of nature
Ω = {ω1,...,ωS}. Uncertainty concerns the prevailing state at T. We
assume that the agent’s information unfolds gradually as time proceeds:
{Ft,t = 0,...,T} is the sequence of partitions of Ω.
This can be described by means of an event-tree. The couple (t,At)
represents a node at time t with At in Ft. At t = 0 there is one node; at
each 0 < t ≤ T there are Nt nodes (NT = S is the cardinality of Ω). Let
N =
PT
t=1 Nt be the number of non-initial nodes of the event-tree (the total
number of nodes being N + 1). We will number the nodes of the tree from
0 to N, where 0 is the initial node, the subsequent N1 are the nodes at time
1, the next N2 are the time-2 nodes and so on.
Given a node ξ = (t,At), t < T,
ξ→ =

ξ0 | ξ0 = (t + 1,At+1),At+1 ⊂ At
	
denotes the set of immediate successors of node ξ. The cardinality of ξ→ is
the branching number of node ξ. The sub-tree of a node ξ is the set of nodes
of the tree following ξ: formally, the sub-tree of node ξ = (t,At) is the set
of nodes (τ,Aτ) such that τ > t and Aτ ⊂ At.
Let there be a frictionless ﬁnancial market where K ﬁnancial contracts are
traded. A ﬁnancial security is characterized by the sequence of its prices at
the nodes of the sub-tree of the node of issue. We assume that the securities
pay no dividend and that the prices of securities are exogenously given.
1For a reference, see Duﬃe and Shafer [9] or Magill and Quinzii [15].
6Let2 {Pk(ξ),ξ = 0,...,N} be the prices of security k at the nodes of
the event-tree, k = 1,...,K. We can consider, with no loss of generality,
the number of securities available for trading as a constant throughout the
event-tree.
A long term position in security k can be split into a sequence of two-
period strategies. At each node ξ = (t,At), with t = 0,...,T − 1, (at the
terminal date T the securities cannot be traded) the security k is bought
for −Pk(ξ) and, in each subsequent node ξ0, the security is sold for Pk(ξ0).
If there is no transaction cost, assuming that the portfolio is rebalanced at
each trading date does not reduce the generality of the model.
Let P(ξ) = (P1(ξ),...,PK(ξ)) be the (row) vector of prices of securities






be the matrix of prices in the successors of node ξ. The rank of P(ξ→) is
called the spanning number of node ξ. Obviously, the spanning number can
not be strictly greater than the branching number.
Let N − =
PT−1
t=0 Nt be the number of non-ﬁnal nodes of the event-tree; i.e.
N − is the number of nodes where the securities are traded. Let M = KN −.

























































2With a slight abuse of notation we identify the node with its number.
7Consider the ﬁrst K columns of this matrix: the ﬁrst row represents the
investment in one unit of each of the K securities at the initial node of the
event-tree. The following N1 rows are the payoﬀ of the subsequent sale in
each node at t = 1. The same meaning can be given to the K columns of
node ξ.






where W0 is the (row) vector of initial prices augmented by a vector of
zeroes and W1 is the matrix of prices at non-initial nodes. Throughout the
paper we assume that W1 has full rank, that is at any date-state couple the
prices of the securities are linearly independent. This is not restrictive: if it
were not the case, we could simply skip the redundant assets.
A portfolio x will be a (column) vector in RM, whose components are
the holdings of the K securities at the nodes of the event-tree. The vector





where the K-vector x(ξ) is the portfolio at the node ξ.
In what follows it will be assumed that the agent can take both long or
short positions in all securities at any node. Given a portfolio x, W0x is
the initial cost and W1x is the payoﬀ produced in the subsequent dates by
x. At an intermediate date, the agent changes his positions in the assets
selling the portfolio he has been holding for one period and buying a new
portfolio. At the ﬁnal date the agent must sell the portfolio and consume
his wealth. Hence, the payoﬀ in node ξ can be described as follows:
(2.1) (W1x)ξ =
(
P(ξ)x(ξ−) − P(ξ)x(ξ) if ξ ∈ Ft,t = 1,...,T − 1
P(ξ)x(ξ−) if ξ ∈ FT
8where ξ− is the (unique) predecessor of node ξ and (·)ξ denotes the ξ-th com-
ponent of a vector. Equation (2.1) holds because of the particular “block”
structure of matrix W.3
3. Hedging a non-redundant contingent claim
Assume that there is an agent with time-separable and Von Neumann-
Morgestern preferences, with a smooth utility function u(·) such that u0 > 0
(strict non-satiation) and u00 < 0 (strict risk-aversion) and with subjective
probability
p = (p1,p2,...,pT)
at the various dates. pt = (pt(1),...,pt(Nt)) is the vector of unconditional
probabilities of nodes (t,At), At ∈ Ft at time t.
The agent has an initial wealth v0 and, in order to maximize the expected
utility for his wealth in the futures dates, he invests v0 in the ﬁnancial
market. The cash ﬂow produced by this strategy is v1, and must be non-
negative.4 The expected utility of v1 at t = 0 is
(3.1) U(v1) = d(1)
N1 X
ξ=1




where vt(ξ) is the wealth at time t and node ξ ∈ Ft and 0 < d(t) ≤ 1 is the
discount factor.
The investment problem at time t = 0 is:5
(3.2) max
z
{U(v1) | v1 = W1z, W0z = v0, v1 ≥ 0}.
3See Example 1 in Section 5.
4We can model diﬀerent strategies: for instance, if we constrain the payoﬀ to be equal
to zero for all intermediate dates and non negative at the last date, we would have a
self-ﬁnancing portfolio strategy.
5The investment problem could have been written as
maxz {U(v1) | v1 = W1z, W0z ≤ v0, v1 ≥ 0}. The assumption on non satiation of
the agent makes the two forms equivalent.
9Let z∗ ∈ RM be the portfolio strategy6 which produces the optimal payoﬀ:
v∗
1 = W1z∗.
Now, assume that the agent is willing to write a contingent claim. In
doing so, the agent will incur the obligation to pay an amount l(t,At) ≥ 0
for all t = 1,...,T: this time-and-state dependent liability is represented
by a (column) vector l1 ∈ RN. Assume that the agent sells a given number
δ 6= 0 of units of the contingent claim for l dollars a piece. The agent’s
goal is to hedge δl1 with a portfolio ﬁnanced with the revenue obtained by
writing the claims: δl. If the claim in non-redundant, the deal involve some
risk for the writer.
The risk of the writer can be reduced in several ways. The most obvious
of these is a super-replication strategy (perfect hedging): the selling price
should be high enough to buy a self-ﬁnancing portfolio whose payoﬀ is at
any date and state not lower then the liability. This is an insurance strategy:
the agent writes the claim but wants to keep his future wealth unaﬀected
by the deal. It is easy to see that the price that permits the writer to insure
its wealth at any node is too high to be paid by any risk-averse buyer.
On the contrary, if the selling price, l, of the claim is too low, the deal
turns to be attractive for some risk-averse counterpart but the writer can
possibly commit his wealth in the deal in some unfavourable state of nature.
There are two problems facing the writer. The ﬁrst one is the valuation of
the claim in order to establish the minimum price that makes issuing a good
trade. Let’s call this reservation selling price. Obviously, any price above
the reservation price would make selling the claim more and more desirable.
The second problem is the choice of a portfolio ﬁnanced with δl to partially
hedge the liability. The agent will honor the liability at each date and state
with the payoﬀ of the hedging portfolio and, if needed, with his own wealth.
6In Section 4 we will give conditions such that Problem (3.2) is meaningful and the
solution is unique.
10The solution of the hedging problem inﬂuences the valuation problem:
actually, the reservation price depends on the hedging opportunities oﬀered
in the ﬁnancial market. If the claim is redundant, the reservation price
must be equal to the cost of the hedging (replicating) portfolio if arbitrage
opportunities are ruled out. In case of non-redundancy, the agent may ﬁnd
it optimal to partially hedge the claim and then to pay the liability also
with his own wealth. In this case, the reservation price depends on the risk
attitude and on the wealth of the agent.
For the sake of exposition, the two steps of the deal will be considered
in reverse order: ﬁrst we will be concerned with the selection of a hedging
portfolio assuming that the claim has already been issued. This provides the
optimal solution as a function of the selling price, considered as a parameter.
Next, we will provide the reservation price of the claim as the value of the
parameter that leaves unaﬀected the optimal expected utility of the payoﬀ.
As for the hedging strategy, the agent uses the (whole) revenue δl to
buy a portfolio x to hedge the liability l1. The net payoﬀ of the deal,
denoted w1 = W1x − δl1, is added to the optimal payoﬀ v∗
1 obtained by
the investment of initial wealth v0. Hence, the agent does not re-discuss the
optimal allocation of the initial wealth as a consequence of the deal, but
can resort to his state-and-time contingent wealth to ﬁnance a loss in some
unfavorable nodes and can beneﬁt of any possible gain. A natural constraint
is v∗
1 + w1 ≥ 0; that is, the agent can resort only to his wealth to pay the
liability.




1 + w1) | w1 = W1x − δl1,W0x = δl,v∗
1 + w1 ≥ 0}.
Remark 3.1. Problem (3.3) is equivalent to
(H) max
y
{U(w1) | w1 = W1y − δl1, W0y = v0 + δl, w1 ≥ 0}.
11To see that this is true, let it be given z∗, the optimal portfolio for problem
(3.2). Since the optimal contingent wealth is traded, by plugging v∗
1 = W1z∗
in (3.3) we obtain:
max
x {U(W1 (z∗ + x) − δl1) | W0x = δl,W1 (z∗ + x) − δl1 ≥ 0}
and, letting y = z∗ +x and observing that W0z∗ = v0, problem (H) follows
immediately.
Problem (H) and problem (3.2) have the same structure. Assuming that
z∗ is known, once the optimal portfolio y∗ for problem (H) has been found,
the hedging portfolio x∗ is given by y∗ − z∗. We will ﬁnd is easier to solve
problem (H) than problem (3.3).
Observe that problem (H) can model also a partial commitment of the
agent in the deal: assume that the agent’s purpose, for the sake of prudence,
is to put only a small fraction of his initial wealth in the deal of writing a
contingent claim. Denote b the budget he is going to put in the deal, b < v0.
As in the case of total commitment (b = v0), the budget can be used to
ﬁnance a portfolio whose payoﬀ maximizes the expected utility for state
contingent wealth. If the agent writes a contingent claim, he will ﬁnd out
the optimal hedging portfolio by solving problem (H) with b in place of v0.
Moreover, if the deal is marginal with respect to the agent’s total wealth
and the agent partially commits with a budget b  v0, then we can assume
that the agent will always be so well oﬀ to be able to pay any outcome
from writing the claim. Formally, if the deal is marginal with respect to
the agent previous investment, the net payoﬀ always satisﬁes the budget
constraint and the nonnegativity constraint in problem (H) can be dropped
(see also Hodges and Neuberger [13]).
With small changes we can model also the problem of the buyer of the
claim. The investment problem from the buyer’s viewpoint has the same
12structure of problem (H) with −δ in place of δ. Given v∗
1, the payoﬀ of the




1 + w1) | w1 = W1x + δl1,W0x = −δl,v∗
1 + w1 ≥ 0}
and x is a portfolio which alters the previous positions in the existing assets.
The equivalence between problem (3.4) and (H) with −δ can be proved with
the argument used above.
4. Existence of a solution and no-arbitrage
In this section we will provide conditions for existence of an optimal so-
lution to Problem (H).7 These conditions are mainly related to the absence
of arbitrage opportunity in the ﬁnancial market.
8 This is related also to the
existence of strictly positive price (row) vectors π = (1,π1) ∈ RN+1
++ called
state-price vectors (π1 is the part of π which refers to non-initial nodes)
such that πW = 0.
A ﬁnancial market is complete if any claim can be replicated by a portfolio
of traded securities. Hence, a market is incomplete if there is at least one
claim that cannot be replicated by trading in the existing securities. It is
known that the ﬁnancial market W is complete if at each node the spanning
number is equal to the branching number [15, Proposition 22.4]. This type
of completeness is referred to as dynamic completeness; that is, although
there are less ﬁnancial securities (K) than states of nature (S), the market
can be completed (in each node) by trading the existing securities if the
number of securities is equal to the number of contingencies at each node.
A ﬁnancial market is incomplete if at some node ξ the spanning number is
strictly smaller that the branching number.
7Since Problem (H) and problem (3.3) have the same structure, the conditions apply
also to the latter one.
8An arbitrage is a portfolio y such that Wy ≥ 0 with at least a positive component.
13In an arbitrage-free ﬁnancial market, completeness can be characterized
also by the existence of a state-prices vector π. If the market is incomplete,
there is an inﬁnite number of state-price vectors such that πW = 0 whereas,
if it is complete, there is a unique state price that satisﬁes that condition.
By relation πW = 0, the price at t < T of the k-th security is the present







Hence πξ0/πξ is called node-price: πξ0/πξ represents the cost in node ξ of an
additional unit of payoﬀ available in node ξ0 ∈ ξ→.
Remark 4.1. If l1 is redundant, then there is only one price, denoted q(l1),
compatible with the absence of arbitrage opportunities. We call q(l1) the
Arrow-Debreu price of the claim.
If there is an arbitrage opportunity, Problem (H) has no solution because
a non satiated agent could increase his utility by increasing the position in
the arbitrage portfolio. The next proposition states that also the converse
is true: if there is no arbitrage, then Problem (H) has a solution.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that the utility function u(·) is continuous and
increasing. Then, Problem (H) has a solution if and only if there is no
arbitrage opportunity in the ﬁnancial market.
To make problem (H) meaningful, the solution must be unique.
Remark 4.3. If the utility function u(·) is smooth and u0 > 0 and u00 < 0,
the solution for Problem (H) is unique.
Throughout the following section we will assume that u satisﬁes the hy-
potheses which ensure that the solution for the hedging problem is unique.
145. Reservation price
In this section we introduce the notion of reservation price of a contingent
claim. Loosely speaking, the reservation price from the point of view of the
writer of the claim is the minimum price that makes the deal better than
staying put.
Given an agent with utility function u, subjective probability p and initial
wealth v0, ﬁrst assume that the agent sells a number δ 6= 0 of contingent
claims for l a piece. The time-and-state contingent payoﬀ of the claim is
l1. The related hedging problem is (H): the agent maximizes the expected
utility for the net payoﬀ w1 = W1x − δl1 of a portfolio strategy x ﬁnanced
with v0 + δl. We denote by U(·) the (indirect) utility for initial wealth plus
the revenue:
(5.1) U(v0+δl) = max
x {U(w1) | w1 = W1x−δl1,W0x = v0+δl, w1 ≥ 0}.
On the other hand, if he does not write the claim, his initial wealth remains
optimally invested according to problem (3.3). In this case, the indirect
utility for initial wealth, denoted V(·), is
(5.2) V(v0) = max
x {U(w1) | w1 = W1x,W0x = v0, w1 ≥ 0}.
Obviously, V(v0) = U(v0 + δl) when no claim is written (δ = 0). The
following proposition is important in order to deﬁne the reservation price.
Proposition 5.1. The indirect utility function U(·) is strictly increasing.
We deﬁne the reservation selling price of the claim with payoﬀ l1 and
denote it by ls as the minimum price that makes writing the claim better
than doing nothing; that is
ls = min{l | U(v0 + δl) ≥ V(v0)}.
Needless to say, ls depends, among the others, both on the initial wealth,
v0, and on the units sold, δ. Since U(·) is strictly increasing, δls is the only
15increment of the initial wealth due to selling δl1, that leaves the optimal
expected utility unchanged. Hence ls satisﬁes equation
(P) U(v0 + δls) = V(v0)
and is called the reservation selling price of a claim with payoﬀ l1. We
observe that ls does not depend on the representation of the preferences but
only on preferences themselves: that is, ls is unchanged if we take an aﬃne
increasing transformation of the utility function u.
The reservation buying price, i.e. the reservation price for the buyer,
(denoted lb) can be deﬁned in the same way by putting −δ in place of δ in
condition (P).
The reservation price can be thought of as the certainty equivalent (c.e.)
of the random payoﬀ l1 under the assumption that the agent is optimally
investing his wealth v0 (see Bellini and Frittelli [2]).
The next proposition states that, when the claim with payoﬀ l1 is redun-
dant, that is, there exists a portfolio ¯ x such that l1 = W1¯ x, the reservation
selling (and buying) price collapses into the Arrow-Debreu price q(l1).
Proposition 5.2. If the contingent claim is redundant then:
(1) ls = lb = q(l1);
(2) the optimal portfolio strategy for problem in (5.1), denoted x∗, is
equal to x∗ = y∗ + δ¯ x, where y∗ is the optimal investment portfolio
for problem in (5.2).
According to this proposition, when the claim is redundant the agent’s
strategy is given by the sum of two portfolios: the hedging (replicating)
portfolio ﬁnanced by δls and the optimal investment portfolio ﬁnanced by
v0. This means that, in case of redundancy, the deal in the contingent claim
does not aﬀect the optimal state-contingent wealth v∗
1 from problem (3.2).
16On the other hand, according to the very deﬁnition (problem (3.3)), when
the claim is non-redundant the net losses from the deal will be paid also
with v∗
1. The next proposition states that the reservation prices always lie
between the bid and the ask price: if the claim is not redundant, the selling
price is strictly lower than the bid price and the buying price is strictly
higher than the ask price.






subject to πW1 = W0, (5.3)
π > 0.
The bid (ask) price is the maximum (minimum) price compatible with no
arbitrage. If we take the dual of the linear program (5.3) we can deﬁne the





subject to W1y ≥ l1 (5.4)
(W1y ≤ l1)
so that the bid price is the minimum cost of a perfect hedge (the ask price
is the maximum cost of a dominated portfolio).
Remark 5.3. If there is no arbitrage in the ﬁnancial market, then the
solution for problem (5.4) is unique.
Proposition 5.4. If the claim is not redundant, then lask < lb and ls < lbid.
To add more intuition to the concepts described above, we provide two
examples regarding option pricing problems. The details of the numerical
procedure can be found in Appendix B.
17Example 1. The ﬁrst example concerns a european call option in a three-
date setting in incomplete ﬁnancial market. We assume that there is a bond
(interest rate equal to 0.1 per period) and a non-dividend paying stock. The
event-tree is as in Figure 1. Assume also that a single european call option
on the stock with strike price X = 110 is sold (δ = 1) (respectively, bought,
δ = −1) by an agent with utility function u(w). We consider exponential
and Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility functions









Let ρ(v0) = −u00(v0)/u0(v0) be the De Finetti-Arrow-Pratt absolute risk
aversion coeﬃcient at v0 and assume the agent has uniform subjective prob-
ability
p = (1/3,1/3,1/3,1/9,...,1/9),
























































Figure 1. Example 1: in the nodes of the event-tree there
are the security prices (bond and stock, respectively) and in
the leaves the payoﬀ of a european call option (X = 110)
written on the stock.









−100 −102.23 0 0 0 0 0 0
110 133.46 −110 −133.46 0 0 0 0
110 111.22 0 0 −110 −111.22 0 0
110 92.69 0 0 0 0 −110 −92.69
0 0 121 174.24 0 0 0 0
0 0 121 145.2 0 0 0 0
0 0 121 121 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 121 145.2 0 0
0 0 0 0 121 121 0 0
0 0 0 0 121 91.66 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 121 121
0 0 0 0 0 0 121 91.66









In Table 1 we show the reservation selling and buying prices of the eu-
ropean call option for diﬀerent risk aversions and wealth. In order to have
somehow comparable results across various utility functions, we adjust the
parameters of the functions to get the same ρ(v0).
Table 1. Example 1: reservation selling and buying prices
for diﬀerent initial wealth v0 and absolute risk aversion ρ’s.
The prices are obtained with α = ρ for exponential and η =
0.1,γ = −1 for HARA utility function. We adjust β in the
HARA case in order to get the desired absolute risk aversion
at v0. All ﬁgures are rounded to the third decimal place.
EXP HARA
ρ(v0) v0 = 10 v0 = 20 v0 = 10 v0 = 20
0.05 16.533 16.507 16.527 16.535
10 16.379 10 16.394
0.1 16.562 16.560 16.590 16.631
10 16.304 10 16.228
0.15 16.609 16.609 16.658 16.779
10 16.228 10 15.782
Observe that an agent with little initial wealth v0 = 10 is willing to spend
his whole endowment to buy the security and that the spread between the
buying and the selling price is larger the higher the risk aversion. This is
also more clearly shown in Figure 2 that depicts the reservation buying and
selling prices against the absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient for an exponential
agent with v0 = 20.
Figure 3 shows reservation selling prices for diﬀerent initial wealth. Note
that the selling price is generally not increasing in the risk aversion coeﬃcient
and that, given the risk aversion, the lower the initial wealth the higher is
19the selling price. The three selling prices collapse to a unique price for ρ
around 0.1: nonnegativity constraints are redundant for such risk averse
agents and it then applies the result stating that the price is independent
on wealth for exponential agents.
The reservation prices of two agents having diﬀerent subjective proba-
bilities are shown in Figure 4 as a function of the absolute risk aversion





























































Figure 2. Reservation selling and buying prices against the
absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient in the case of exponential
utility (v0 = 20).
Example 2. This example is intended to mimic the pricing of a spread option
(which has ﬁnal payoﬀ max(0,S2−S1−X) where S1 and S2 are the prices of
two risky assets). No analytical formula is known to price such derivative and






















Figure 3. Reservation selling prices against the absolute
risk aversion coeﬃcient in the case of exponential utility for
diﬀerent initial endowments (v0 = 10,20,30).
the selling (δ = 1) (respectively, the buying) price of the spread option with
X = 5, in an incomplete ﬁnancial market where just the securities S1 and S2
(and no risk-less bond) are available. The event-tree is described in Figure 5.
Note that we are implicitly assuming a positive correlation among assets,
which need not to be the case (see [4]). The subjective probabilities and
discounting of the agent are the same as in Example 1.
The agent’s preferences are represented by exponential, HARA (as de-
ﬁned above) and logarithmic utility function, u(w) = log(w + M), where
M is suitably chosen. The reservation prices obtained for some wealth and
absolute risk aversion coeﬃcients are shown in Table 2. Again, we adjust
parameters β and M to have same ρ(v0). In two cases, however, this nor-























Figure 4. Reservation selling and buying prices against the
absolute risk aversion for exponential agents with diﬀerent
subjective probabilities, respectively p and q.
Table 2. Example 2: reservation selling and buying prices
for diﬀerent budget and absolute risk aversions. The ﬁgures
for exponential utility are obtained setting α = ρ for expo-
nential and η = 0.1,γ = −1 for HARA utility function. We
adjust M and β in order to get absolute risk aversion ρ at v0
with logarithmic and HARA utilities. All ﬁgures are rounded
to the third decimal place.
EXP HARA LOG
ρ(v0) v0 = 10 v0 = 20 v0 = 10 v0 = 20 v0 = 10 v0 = 20
0.05 3.371 3.375 3.375 3.387 3.381 3.411
3.309 3.314 3.305 3.306 3.230 3.290
0.1 3.405 3.413 3.425 3.481 3.462 -
3.282 3.291 3.263 3.242 3.222 -
0.15 3.437 3.449 3.489 3.693 3.642 -
3.254 3.268 3.201 3.049 2.972 -
Figure 6 shows the reservation prices obtained with logarithmic utility
against v0. The interval spanned by reservation selling and buying prices
























































Figure 5. Example 2: security prices (in the nodes) and
payoﬀ of a spread option (X = 5) (on the leaves).
aversion dependent on v0, a bigger endowment comes together with smaller
risk aversion. Finally it is interesting to contrast reservation, bid and ask
prices. The latter are respectively 4.359 and 1.328 (not plotted for graphical
convenience), and span a much wider interval than utility based prices.
6. Concluding remarks
In this article we introduced the reservation price as a valuation criterion
for a newly-issued non-redundant contingent claim in an incomplete ﬁnancial
market. We described also some properties of the price both from the seller’s
and the buyer’s viewpoints.
There are two issues that need to be addressed at the end of this work.
The ﬁrst is that we assumed that the equilibrium in the ﬁnancial market is
unaﬀected by the introduction of the new claim. This is unlikely to last for a
long time. Essentially, when a non-redundant contingent claim is issued, the
prices of the existing ﬁnancial securities change because the opportunities
oﬀered by the ﬁnancial market to hedge risky positions are diﬀerent. This
























Figure 6. Reservation selling and buying prices against ini-
tial wealth v0 in the case of logarithmic utility (M = 15).
and, as a consequence, the prices of the existing assets. The same can be
said for other pricing criteria in incomplete markets oﬀered in the literature
[1, 5, 7, 8, 13]. With respect to this, our pricing criterion is best suited to
determine the initial (oﬀered or requested) price of the claim.
The second issue is that our model describes the behavior of a single part:
either the writer or the buyer. It is quite natural to extend the model in
order to describe the bargaining process between the parts. Assuming that
both parts select the hedging portfolio by maximizing the expected utility
of the net payoﬀ, and if the reservation price for the writer is lower than
the reservation price for the buyer, then there is room for bargaining. The
existence and the properties of the bargaining solution will be the subject
of future research.
24Appendix A. Proof of propositions
Let B be the set of feasible net payoﬀs:
B =

w1 ∈ RN | w1 = W1x − δl1,W0x = v0 + δl, w1 ≥ 0
	
.
We will denote the set of arbitrage-free state-price vectors by
Π =
n
π = (1,π1) ∈ RN+1
++ | πW = 0
o
and by c`Π its closure. Let Bπ denote the budget-feasible set according to a
given state-price vector π ∈ c`Π:
Bπ =

w1 ∈ RN | π1(w1 + δl1) = v0 + δl, π = (1,π1) ∈ Π, w1 ≥ 0
	
.
The following preliminary results can be easily proved:
Lemma A.1. For all π ∈ c`Π, B ⊂ Bπ.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. This proposition is drawn on a well known theo-
rem stating the equivalence between the existence of a solution for a con-
sumption - investment problem and the absence of arbitrage opportunities
in a ﬁnancial market [15, Th. 9.3].
To prove necessity, if Problem (H) has a solution, then there is no ar-
bitrage. Assume that x is an optimal portfolio such that w = Wx − δl,
with w = (−v0,w1) and l = (−l,l1). If there was an arbitrage y such that
Wy ≥ 0 with at least a positive component, then we would have
w = Wx − δl ≤ Wx + Wy − δl = w0,
where w0 = (−v0,w0
1), that is, we would have w ≤ w0 with a strict inequality
for at least a component, against the assumption that w is optimal. This
ends the necessity part.
To prove suﬃciency, absence of arbitrage opportunities is equivalent to the
existence of a state-price vector π ∈ RN+1
++ . According to [15, Proposition
7.3], this implies that the budget-feasible set, Bπ, is compact. Since B is
25closed, also B ⊂ Bπ, from Lemma A.1, is compact. Hence, Problem (H) has
a solution because U(·) is continuous. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Let θ = v0+δl. First we prove that θ0 > θ implies
U(θ0) ≥ U(θ). To see that this is true, deﬁne the set of feasible portfolios
D = {x | W0x ≤ θ,W1x ≥ δl1}
It is easy to see that D(θ) ⊂ D(θ0). Hence, the optimal expected utility of
w1 = W1 − δl1 is not lower in D(θ0) than in D(θ).
We have to prove that, if θ0 > θ, we cannot have U(θ) = U(θ0). Actually,
if the last equality held, then denoting with w1(θ) the optimal net payoﬀ
as a function of θ, this would give w1(θ) = w1(θ0) for the uniqueness of
the solution. Since W1 has full rank, then this would imply that x(θ) =
x(θ0), where x(θ) is the optimal portfolio supporting w1(θ), that is w1(θ) =
W1x(θ) − δl1. The last equality gives θ = W0x(θ) = W0x(θ0) = θ0. And
this contradicts the assumption. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2.
(1) Since there is a ¯ x such that W1¯ x = l1, let q(l1) = W0¯ x be the Arrow-
Debreu price of l1. By letting x = y +δ¯ x, the hedging problem (H)
becomes
max{U(w1) | w1 = W1x − δl1,W0x = v0 + δl,w1 ≥ 0} =
max{U(w1) | w1 = W1y,W0y = v0 − δq(l1) + δl,w1 ≥ 0}.
Since
V(v0) = max{U(w1) | w1 = W1x,W0x = v0,w1 ≥ 0},
clearly V(v0) = V(v0−δq(l1)+δl). Since V(·) is a strictly increasing
function (Proposition 5.1), then ls = q(l1). The proof for the buying
price is the same, by taking x = y + δ¯ x in place of x = y − δ¯ x.
26(2) Let x∗ be optimal for problem (5.1) and let x∗ = y∗ + δ¯ x. Since
l1 = W1¯ x and using part (1) of Proposition 5.2, we have that y∗ is
optimal for problem (5.2).
On the other hand, let y∗ be the optimal strategy for prob-
lem (5.2). Then by taking y∗ = x∗ − δ¯ x we have that x∗ is optimal
for problem (5.1).

Proof of Proposition 5.4. We prove that ls ≤ lbid for any claim. Let w1 be
the optimal net payoﬀ according to problem (3.3) with δ = 1 for convenience.
Moreover, let deﬁne the net payoﬀ b w1 = W1b x − l1, where b x is the perfect
hedging portfolio such that W0b x = lbid (see problem in (5.4)). Since b w1 ≥ 0,
then U(v1 + b w1) ≥ U(v1) because u(·) is strictly increasing, where v1 is




U(v1 + w1) | w1 = W1x − l1,W0x = lbid,v1 + w1 ≥ 0
o
≥
≥ U(v1 + b w1),
then we have, by deﬁnition of reservation selling price,
U(v0 + δlbid) ≥ V(v0) = U(v0 + ls),
and since U(·) is monotone (Proposition 5.1), ls ≤ lbid. Strict inequality
ls < lbid in case of non-redundancy of the claim follows immediately from
condition b w1 ≥ 0 and b w1 6= 0.
To prove that lask < lb, let it be given b w1 = W1b x − l1, where b x is
the perfect hedging portfolio such that W0b x = lask (from problem (5.4)).




U(v1 + w1) | w1 = −W1x + l1,W0x = lask,v1 + w1 ≥ 0
o
≤
≤ U(v1 + b w1),
then the inequality can be proved with the same argument used before. 
27Appendix B. The numerical algorithm
The reservation price, as seen in section 5, is deﬁned as the unique solution
of equation (P). Once v0,W0,W1 and δ are ﬁxed the left hand side of (P) is
a function of the price ls while the right hand side V(v0) is a ﬁxed constant,
namely the optimal utility that can be attained if no security is written.
Equation (P) can be solved by bisection, after ls is bracketed in an interval
[l∗,l∗] such that
U(v0 + δl∗) ≤ V(v0) ≤ U(v0 + δl∗).
Clearly, each evaluation of function U need the solution of the constrained
optimization problem (H). To this aim, we used the “NEOS Server for
Optimization” hosted at Argonne National Laboratories.9 Actually, NEOS
is an acronym for Network-Enabled Optimization System. This site of-
fers a variety of solvers for general optimization problems. The user is
asked to precisely deﬁne the problem, to submit it to the server in one
of several possible ways and to specify a suitable solver. In particular,
we adopt the AMPL language (Fourer et al. [12]) to submit the problem
(H) and use the LANCELOT solver to get a solution (Conn et al. [6] or
see www.cse.clrc.ac.uk/Activity/LANCELOT for details). Each result was
checked using the MINOS solver, which is available at NEOS server too: the
two programs always produced the same solution, up to required precision.
Further details on MINOS can be found in Fourer’s book or at the NEOS
server.
Note that it is not trivial to execute a bisection algorithm in a pure
optimization environment. In fact, although it is quite easy to solve an
optimization problem using the AMPL language, it is not straightforward
to program an iterative procedure like bisection. However, taking proﬁt of
9URL: http://www-neos.mcs.anl.gov
28the AMPL statements let and if, it is possible to iterate the solution of
problem (H) to compute ls repeating the following AMPL code
let l_down := if optimal_U < VV_0 then l else l_down;
let l_up := if optimal_U > VV_0 then l else l_up;
let l := if optimal_U < VV_0 then (l+l_up)/2 else (l+l_down)/2;
solve;
that performs a bisection step. The notation of the code is suggestive of that
in the paper, namely l down = l∗,l up = l∗,VV 0 = V(v0) and optimal U is
the optimal value of problem (H), given l = ls. Observe that each step of
the bisection algorithm is followed by the solution of problem (H) (solve)
which allows to perform another step of the bisection procedure.
In summary, we numerically compute the reservation price in two steps:
solution of a constrained multidimensional optimization problem by submis-
sion to the LANCELOT solver and solution of the equation (P) by bisection
method, iterating the previous point until convergence is reached. In par-
ticular, we stop iterating when two successive values of the price ls diﬀer by
less than 10−4.
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